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I.  Introduction
 When we think about where a lawyer’s loyalty lies, our thoughts most 
naturally turn to her client.1 After all, a lawyer owes her client a duty to 
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1See 1 R (T)   L G L § 16 cmt. e (2000) [here-
inafter R] (“The responsibilities entailed in promoting the objectives of the client 
may be broadly classified as duties of loyalty . . . .”); Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging the 
Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 L. L.A. L. R. 693, 702 (1997) (“[T]he 
lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client is an integral and essential part of the adversary system.”); 
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provide competent representation,2 a duty to “act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness,”3 a duty to maintain the client’s confidences,4 and a duty to 
avoid undertaking a new matter that conflicts with the interests of her client 
(and, in some cases, even those of a prospective or a former client).5 All of 
these various duties to the client are summed up in the lawyer’s charge to act 
“with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal 
in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”6
 However, a lawyer also sometimes owes a duty to others that trumps her 
duty to her client. For example, no matter how much it may personally ben-
efit the client, a lawyer is ethically prohibited from counseling her client to 
engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct;7 unlawfully obstructing another 
party’s access to evidence;8 unlawfully altering, destroying, or concealing 
evidence;9 falsifying evidence or counseling or assisting a witness to testify 
falsely;10 or making frivolous discovery requests.11 Moreover, a lawyer has 
“special duties . . . as [an] officer[] of the court to avoid conduct that under-
mines the integrity of the adjudicative process.”12 Most notably, a lawyer owes 
a duty of candor to a court, arbitrator, administrative agency, or any “other 
David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 T L. R. 331, 344 (2006) (“In our adversarial 
system, lawyers generally owe duties to their own client, but not to the other side. In tax 
planning, the other side is the government, and even when a lawyer is giving advice about 
planning, she focuses on what would happen if the matter is litigated.”); Linda Galler, The Tax 
Lawyer’s Duty to the System, 16 V. T R. 681, 687 (1997) (reviewing B W 
 ., E P  F T P (3d ed. 1995)) (“The notion of zealous 
representation of client interests is intuitive to law students . . . .”); see also Linda M. Beale, 
Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 
25 V. T R. 583, 595 (2006) (speaking of “a social norm and standards of tax practice, 
including a client-centered ethical structure, that favor client advocacy and tax minimization 
over duty to the tax system”).




5Id. R. 1.7, 1.9, 1.18.
6Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1; see also R, supra note 1, at § 16 cmt. d (observing that such 
statements indicating that a lawyer should act “zealously” on behalf of her client “set[] forth 
a traditional aspiration”). For a discussion of several additional rules that impose duties that 
protect the client, see Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics of Tax Cloning, 6 F. T R. 251, 
315–16 (2003) [hereinafter Infanti, Tax Cloning].




11Id. R. 3.4(d). For a discussion of additional rules that protect the interests of third parties, 
see Infanti, Tax Cloning, supra note 6, at 315–19.
12M R  P ’ C R. 3.3 cmt. 2.
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body acting in an adjudicative capacity,” even if the information that must be 
revealed is otherwise subject to the duty to maintain client confidences.13
 Likewise, it is generally—though by no means universally—acknowledged 
that a tax lawyer owes a similar special duty to the tax system that may con-
flict with and constrain the duty that she owes to her clients.14 The American 
13Id. R. 1.0(m); see id. R. 3.3. For a discussion of additional rules that are designed to protect 
the integrity of the adjudicative process, see Infanti, Tax Cloning, supra note 6, at 315–17.
14E.g., B W  ., S  T P § 101.2 (6th ed. 2004); 
Beale, supra note 1, at 595, 661; Mortimer M. Caplin, Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser—
A Perspective, 40 T 1030, 1032 (1962); Frederic G. Corneel, Guidelines to Tax Practice 
Third, 57 T L. 181, 187, 192–93 (2003) [hereinafter Corneel, Guidelines Third]; Frederic 
G. Corneel, Guidelines to Tax Practice Second, 43 T L. 297, 301–02 (1990) [hereinafter 
Corneel, Guidelines Second]; Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s Professional Responsibility, 
39 U. F. L. R. 1027, 1028–29, 1031 n.9, 1050 n.81 (1987); Richard Lavoie, Deputizing 
the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 V. T R. 
43, 79, 89–91 (2001) [hereinafter Lavoie, Gunslingers]; Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of 
Law: The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. C. L. R. 115, 190 (2004); 
John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer’s Tax Practice, 13 T L. R. 27, 35–36, 
44 (1957); Randolph E. Paul, The Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, 63 H. L. R. 377, 
381–82, 384, 386–88 (1950); Harold S. Peckron, Watchdogs That Failed to Bark: Standards of 
Tax Review After Enron, 5 F. T R. 853, 866–67, 901–03 (2002); J. Timothy Philipps, 
It’s Not Easy Being Easy: Advising Tax Return Positions, 50 W.  L L. R. 589, 589 & 
n.2 (1993); Prescott, supra note 1, at 715, 772; Paul J. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter 
Opinions, 34 T L. 5, 30, 38 (1980); Schizer, supra note 1, at 370; Randolph W. Thrower, 
Preserving the Integrity of the Federal Tax System, 33 N.Y.U. A. I.  F. T’ 707, 
709–10 (1975); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Filling the Ethical Void: Treasury’s 1986 Circular 230 Pro-
posal, 112 T N (TA) 691, 694–95 (2006) [hereinafter Ventry, Filling the Ethical Void]; 
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Lowering the Bar: ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 112 T N (TA) 69, 
70 (2006) [hereinafter Ventry, Lowering the Bar]; Johnnie M. Walters, Ethical and Professional 
Responsibilities of Tax Practitioners, 17 G. L. R. 23, 24, 25–26, 33, 35 (1981); Galler, 
supra note 1, at 687; Matthew C. Ames, Note, Formal Opinion 352: Professional Integrity and 
the Tax Audit Lottery, 1 G. J. L E 411, 414–15, 427 (1987); Ann Southworth, 
Note, Redefining the Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 S. L. R. 889, 891, 908–12, 
914, 918 (1985); see also Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax 
Shelter Industry, 23 Y J.  R. 77, 82, 114, 119, 120 (2006) (explaining the organized 
tax bar’s efforts to reign in corporate tax shelters, which were neither in the economic interests 
of the tax lawyers themselves or their clients, as an attempt to re-affirm tax lawyers’ status as 
gatekeepers of the tax system and describing these lawyers as viewing themselves as having 
obligations to the tax system). Contra Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual 
Responsibility to His Client and to the Government?—The Theory, 15 S. C. T I. 25 pas-
sim (1963); Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the System, 47 
U. K. L. R. 847, 851, 871, 909 (1999); see Camilla E. Watson, Legislating Morality: The 
Duty to the Tax System Reconsidered, 51 U. K. L. R. 1197, 1197, 1236–37 (2003) (revisit-
ing her earlier position in light of intervening events and concluding that “it is now painfully 
clear that relying on an ideological ‘duty to the system’ has not worked,” but acknowledging 
that the notion that tax lawyers owe a special duty to the tax system is “the popular view among 
tax scholars”).
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Bar Association (ABA) appears to straddle the fence in this debate, provid-
ing aid and comfort to both sides. On the one hand, the ABA has formally 
adopted the view that tax compliance is often the first step in an adversarial 
process,15 providing justification for those who reject anything but undivided 
loyalty to the client in interactions with the Service.16 On the other hand, 
the ABA permits lawyers to draw on nonlegal considerations (for example, 
“moral, economic, social and political factors”)17 when rendering advice to 
clients and further urges lawyers to participate “in activities for improving the 
law, the legal system or the legal profession,”18 thus opening the door for the 
view that tax lawyers actually have competing loyalties to their clients and to 
the tax system.
 In any event, there is some intuitive appeal to the notion that a tax lawyer 
must balance the duty to her client against a countervailing duty to the tax 
15ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (“In many 
cases a lawyer must realistically anticipate that the filing of the tax return may be the first step 
in a process that may result in an adversary relationship between the client and the IRS.”). This 
position presents a very slight step back from an earlier position that clearly equated prepara-
tion of a tax return with an adversarial proceeding. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965). The position is clarified in the Report of the Special 
Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352:
The Opinion does not state that the general ethical guidelines governing advocacy in 
litigation are determinative, or suggest that tax returns are adversarial proceedings. To 
the contrary, a tax return initially serves a disclosure, reporting, and self-assessment 
function. It is the citizen’s report to the government of his or her relevant activities 
for the year. The Opinion says that because some returns, particularly aggressive ones, 
may result in an adversary relationship, there is a place for consideration of the ethical 
considerations regarding advocacy. Thus, the Opinion blends the ethical guidelines 
governing advocacy with those applicable to advising, from which the new ethical 
standard is derived.
Paul J. Sax et al., Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 T L. 635, 
640 (1986); see also Beale, supra note 1, at 628–29 (describing ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 as 
“still treating the relationship between attorneys and the Service as adversarial”); Durst, supra 
note 14, at 1030–49 (describing ABA Formal Opinions 314 and 85-352, as well as the history 
behind the transition from the ABA’s earlier to its later position on the nature of tax return 
preparation, and concluding that, “[o]n the whole, [ABA Formal Opinion 85-352] seems to 
reaffirm the view of the return as an adversarial document”); Prescott, supra note 1, at 719–20 
(“The Committee began its reconsideration of the lawyer’s duties as a tax return advisor by 
implicitly endorsing the conclusion of Formal Opinion 314 that the return preparation pro-
cess should be treated as an adversarial proceeding and that the tax lawyer’s duties are those of 
an advocate.” (footnotes omitted)); Ventry, Lowering the Bar, supra note 14, at 70 (“By assum-
ing an adversarial relationship, Opinion 85-352 reprised Opinion 314, which had identified 
the IRS as an adversarial party in its first sentence.”); id. at 74 (critiquing the assumption of an 
adversarial relationship between taxpayers and the Service in ABA Formal Opinion 85-352).
16Prescott, supra note 1, at 705.
17M R  P ’ C R. 2.1.
18Id. R. 6.1(b)(3).
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system.19 From the start, the taxpayer has a decided advantage over the gov-
ernment in tax matters merely by dint of the ability to self-assess her rightful 
share of the overall tax burden. Under our self-assessment system, the tax-
payer has the advantage of: (1) being the only party with full knowledge of 
the relevant facts; (2) maintaining a great deal of control over whether—and, 
if so, how—those facts are shared with the government; and (3) knowing that 
the government lacks the resources to audit compliance with the tax laws in 
19See Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in the Professionalism of the Tax 
Bar, 22 V. T R. 589, 603–11 (2003) [hereinafter Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut].
Naturally, the duty to the tax system is not the sole countervailing consideration in deter-
mining the appropriate tax treatment for a transaction. A tax lawyer must also consider the 
applicability of civil or criminal penalties (or both) to a position taken on a tax return. See 
I.R.C. §§ 6694, 7701(a)(36)(A) (respectively, tax return preparer penalties and definition of 
tax return preparer); Reg. § 1.6694-1(b)(3) (indicating that an attorney who provides advice 
to a client with regard to the treatment of a significant item on a client’s tax return can be 
considered a tax return preparer for purposes of this penalty); Reg. § 301.7701-15(b) (stating 
a similar rule, which is incorporated by reference in section 6694(f )); Anthony C. Infanti, The 
Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 S C L. R. 763, 790–800 [hereinafter 
Infanti, Sodomy Statute] (describing the civil and criminal penalties that may apply to lesbian 
and gay taxpayers). Some would argue that, when assessing the potential cost of these penalties, 
a “rational” actor would discount the nominal amount of these penalties to reflect the relatively 
low likelihood of detection, which, in practice, would render these penalties a relatively weak 
form of constraint. Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, 
and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 C. L. R. 569, 571, 576–77, 593–94 (2006); see also 
Beale, supra note 1, at 612 (describing the current era as being characterized by “low enforce-
ment resources and an ‘economically rational “audit lottery” discount’” (quoting Robert A. 
Rizzi, Tax Shelters Invade: Corporate Transactions and the Anti-Shelter Crusade, C. T’, 
July-Aug. 2004, at 22)); Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra, at 801 & n.133 (indicating that the tax 
laws are underenforced, but nevertheless citing instances in which lesbian and gay taxpayers 
have been pursued by the Service). 
In any event, my focus here is not on civil and criminal penalties, but on the duty to the tax 
system—despite the contention of some that it “is too slender a reed to support cooperation 
with the government.” Schizer, supra note 1, at 371. In this regard, I disagree with those who 
paint tax lawyers as essentially amoral, rational economic actors who help the government only 
when it furthers their own (or their clients’) interests and who surreptitiously work to defeat 
any obligation to help the government that does not serve their own (or their clients’) interests 
by engaging in the most parsimonious of readings of those obligations. See id. at 342–45, 
355–71; cf. Corneel, Guidelines Second, supra note 14, at 299 (“The firm expects each attorney 
involved in tax matters to adhere to these guidelines, accepting them not as technical rules of 
law to be avoided by the clever exercise of lawyerly skills, but rather as a guide to a satisfying 
professional life and to the building of a professional environment in which we can be com-
fortable in the knowledge that others in the firm bring to bear the same standards.”). This 
reductionist portrait does not accurately depict many of the tax lawyers with whom I worked 
when in practice. I agree instead with those who argue against discounting the force of a law-
yer’s “internally generated allegiance to the public aspects of legal practice.” David Wilkins, 
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 H. L. R. 799, 866 (1992). Indeed, as Wilkins notes, 
“[M]any students go to law school precisely because they seek a way of life that places public 
commitments at least on a par with the pursuit of private profit.” Id. at 866 n.296.
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all but a small handful of cases.20 This combination of advantages creates an 
incentive for taxpayers either to avoid reporting questionable transactions at 
all or, if they must, to report them in a way that will not draw the attention of 
the Service. In this way, taxpayers can play the audit “lottery” with the confi-
dence that, in all likelihood, their returns will escape scrutiny and, as a result, 
questionable positions taken on those returns will be confirmed by default.21 
To superimpose unbridled loyalty to the client over these already hefty advan-
tages would only seem to foster abuse of the tax system that will undermine 
its integrity and, eventually, erode its viability as a means of collecting the 
revenue upon which the functioning of our government depends.
 Unfortunately, however, intuitive appeal often leads to unthinking applica-
tion.22 Thus, a tax lawyer might be tempted to apply this conventional con-
ceptualization of the duty to the tax system—that is, as a necessary temper for 
unbridled zealous advocacy—to the unconventional advice that she provides 
to her lesbian and gay clients. As explored more fully below, lesbians and gay 
men do not experience the tax system in the same way that heterosexuals do. 
In contrast to heterosexuals, lesbians and gay men are in the unique position 
of being the only group that is the object of both overt and covert invidious 
discrimination in the application of the tax laws. An important effect of this 
discrimination is to turn what is a tactical advantage in the hands of hetero-
sexual taxpayers into the only defense—and, it is worth noting, a defense that 
often comes at the price of self-stigmatization—that lesbians and gay men 
20See Prescott, supra note 1, at 711–13; see also Beale, supra note 1, at 636 (“Because of the 
Service’s limited enforcement resources, the audit lottery remains a manageable risk for many 
sophisticated taxpayers. As a result, numerous transactions that the government would con-
sider abusive likely remain obscured within a complex layer of business transactions and are 
never exposed to litigation.”).
21Philipps, supra note 14, at 612. The author states:
The nature of the tax return audit process dictates that most returns will not be 
picked for audit. This means that a taxpayer who resolves all doubts in his own favor 
always has an advantage, because the return is not likely to be audited. In effect, this 
treatment decides almost all doubtful questions in favor of the taxpayer.
Id.; see Prescott, supra note 1, at 712–13.
22It is worth noting here that this Article is part of a larger project of employing a critical 
perspective to question and problematize distinctions and concepts in the tax policy literature 
that, on their face, seem normal, natural, or just plainly incontestable. See Anthony C. Infanti, 
A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure Analysis, Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a 
Collective Identity, 26 W L. R. 707 (2005) [hereinafter Infanti, Identity Crisis] (high-
lighting the artificiality of the mainstream/marginal distinction in the tax policy literature and 
drawing attention to the ways in which that distinction can be employed to ignore or discredit 
critical contributions to that literature); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 B. L. R. 
1191 (2008) [hereinafter Infanti, Tax Equity] (exploring how the core tax policy concept of 
equity can have negative effects on the contributions of critical tax scholars to the tax policy 
literature).
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have against an overreaching federal government. As a result, if a tax lawyer 
were to temper her advice to lesbian and gay clients in accordance with the 
conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system, she might not 
only undercut the effectiveness of these defenses, but also risk doing serious 
harm to her clients. In either case, the tax lawyer would have become an 
accomplice of the federal government in its invidious discrimination against 
her lesbian and gay clients. 
 This Article deconstructs23 the conventional conceptualization of the duty 
to the tax system in an effort to open the necessary ethical space for crafting 
an alternative view of that duty—one that better suits the representation of 
lesbian and gay clients. Precisely because of its conventionality, the common 
conceptualization of the duty to the tax system is an overweeningly heter-
onormative24 one. By this, I mean that this conceptualization reflects “the 
largely unstated assumption that heterosexuality is the essential and elemental 
ordering principal of society.”25 Having been crafted with only heterosexuals 
in mind, the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system 
reflects heterosexual taxpayers’ considerable tactical advantages over the Ser-
vice and posits a nearly constant tension between that duty and the tax law-
yer’s duty of zealous advocacy. In contrast, the alternative view that I lay out 
in this Article delineates a duty to the tax system that exists in harmony with, 
rather than opposition to, the duty of zealous advocacy. This alternative view 
allows a tax lawyer simultaneously to protect her lesbian and gay clients from 
harm and to discharge her obligation to safeguard the integrity of the tax sys-
tem by actively preventing its abuse by an overreaching federal government.
23As I have explained at length elsewhere, “the term ‘deconstruction’  has multiple meanings 
in the legal academic literature.” Infanti, Identity Crisis, supra note 22, at 746–47. As I use the 
term here, “deconstruction refers to ‘a methodology, an interpretive tool’ that ‘is the brainchild 
of Jacques Derrida,’ a French philosopher.” Id. at 747 (quoting Vivian Grosswald Curran, 
Deconstruction, Structuralism, Antisemitism and the Law, 36 B.C. L. R. 1, 4, 6 (1994)). In 
particular, I primarily employ the deconstructionist technique of inverting hierarchical oppo-
sitions in this Article. See id. at 752–83 (discussing the inversion of hierarchies and provid-
ing numerous examples of this interpretive technique from both inside and outside the tax 
literature); see also Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Protest, “A Homosexual,” and Frivolity: A Decon-
structionist Meditation, 24 S. L U. P. L. R. 21, 40-58 (2005) [hereinafter Infanti, 
Deconstructionist Meditation] (employing deconstructionist etymological analysis, a technique 
that I also employ in this article). That is, I attempt in this Article to show how the rationale 
underlying the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system, which requires 
the privileging of the interests of the government over those of the individual taxpayer when 
the tax treatment of a transaction is uncertain, can actually be used to turn that conceptualiza-
tion of the duty to the tax system on its head in the case of lesbian and gay taxpayers—resulting 
in the privileging of the interests of lesbian and gay taxpayers over those of the government 
when the tax treatment of their transactions is uncertain.
24See generally Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. V. L. R. 
129 (1998). 
25Id. at 133.
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  I have divided the remainder of this Article into four parts. Part II sketches 
the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system and its rela-
tionship to a tax lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy. Part III offers a lesbian and 
gay perspective on the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax 
system. Part IV relaxes the assumption that all taxpayers are heterosexual and 
explain how the duty to the tax system and the duty of zealous advocacy can 
nicely coalesce in the representation of lesbian and gay taxpayers. Part V sets 
forth my brief concluding remarks.
II.  The Duty to the Tax System: The Heteronormative View
This Part briefly describes the conventional conceptualization of the duty 
to the tax system. The first section summarizes the justifications that com-
mentators offer for imposing a duty to the tax system on tax lawyers. The 
following section sketches the (admittedly, ambiguous) contours of that duty. 
Both sections underscore the tension between the duty to the tax system and 
the duty of zealous advocacy that is intrinsic to the heteronormative view of 
the tax world.
A.  Justifications for the Duty to the Tax System
Commentators have offered a variety of justifications for imposing a duty to 
the tax system on tax lawyers. Some view the imposition of this duty as part of 
a mutually beneficial exchange transaction: “the tax system gives tax lawyers 
their livelihood, so they in turn owe a duty to nurture it.”26 Others view the 
duty as grounded in patriotism; that is, it arises out of “the gratitude that any 
citizen should feel for the freedom and security the U.S. government pro-
vides; if we feel grateful, we should want to preserve the government’s lifeline, 
the tax system.”27 In a similar (though less overtly patriotic) vein, yet other 
commentators argue that “it is a principal ethical obligation of the tax lawyer 
to devote attention, energy and time to our tax law and our tax system . . . in 
order to avoid collapse of our governmental system.”28 
 To render the duty more tangible and personally relevant, some commen-
tators remind us that we all have a direct stake in our government and in the 
tax system that supports it:29
26Schizer, supra note 1, at 370.
27Id.
28Walters, supra note 14, at 24. The author notes:
I am of the school that charges the tax lawyer with additional duties and responsibili-
ties. Why is this so? In one sentence—our tax system is the very basic support for our 
democratic system of government and private enterprise, and the tax lawyer plays a 
major role in the effective functioning of our tax system.
Id. at 25-26.
29The following passage is quoted from Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut, supra note 19, at 607, with 
original footnotes altered to comport with this Article.
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Despite being referred to as a duty to the abstract and impersonal revenue “system,” 
one commentator has envisaged the obligees of this duty as the more concrete and 
sympathetic class of “unrepresented citizens who ascribe value to a well-functioning 
tax system.”30 All citizens have a general interest in ensuring the government’s abil-
ity to fund itself.31 More immediately, however, each citizen also has an interest in 
ensuring that the burden of funding the government is borne by each taxpayer in 
accordance with the allocation prescribed by their democratically-elected [sic] repre-
sentatives.32 After all, to the extent that one taxpayer is able to avoid a portion of her 
tax burden, that burden must be taken up by every other taxpayer.33
But a more common—and more plausible—justification for imposing a duty 
to the tax system on tax lawyers relies upon the realities of the tax compliance 
and enforcement process:34
[T]he adversary in tax matters is always the government, which relies on self-assess-
ment to collect taxes.35 Unlike other adversaries, who can be expected “to scruti-
nize critically the lawyer’s statements,”36 the government lacks the resources to audit 
more than a small portion of the returns that are filed by taxpayers.37 Consequently, 
the tax lawyer may often be the ultimate arbiter of what the revenue laws require.38
In other words, the duty to the tax system serves to level the playing field 
between two unequally matched adversaries. It requires the tax lawyer, who is 
representing the relatively more powerful player in this match-up (that is, the 
taxpayer), to take account of the interests of the less powerful player (that is, 
the government) whenever she exercises discretion, as she inevitably does,39 in 
settling on the appropriate tax characterization of a transaction.40
30Southworth, supra note 14, at 912.
31Galler, supra note 1, at 694.
32Id.
33Walters, supra note 14, at 37 (“Under our self-assessment tax system, where each taxpayer 
is charged with returning and paying his fair share of our tax burden, any reduction, lawful or 
unlawful, impacts adversely on the tax burdens of every other American, including even the 
lawyer representing that taxpayer.”).
34Please note that the passage that follows in the text above is quoted from Infanti, Eyes Wide 
Shut, supra note 19, at 606, with original footnotes altered to comport with this Article.
35Galler, supra note 1, at 694.
36Durst, supra note 14, at 1034.
37Id.; Walters, supra note 14, at 36; Galler, supra note 1, at 694–95.
38Durst, supra note 14, at 1035; Prescott, supra note 1, at 713–14; Southworth, supra note 
14, at 910–11.
39“[A] short training in tax law will convince the most stubborn of intellects that there is no 
such thing as words so plain that they do not have to be interpreted.” Randolph E. Paul, Motive 
and Intent in Federal Tax Law, in S S  F T: S S 
255, 272 (Randolph E. Paul et al., eds. 1938); see also Philipps, supra note 14, at 590 (“Clients 
do not come to tax lawyers for expensive advice on easy questions. The lawyer normally must 
give advice where either the law itself or the application of the facts to the law is uncertain.”).
40In speaking of the representation of powerful corporate interests (e.g., savings and loans in 
the 1980s and Enron more recently) against the government, Susan Carle similarly argues:
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 At first blush, this analogy to a game in which the taxpayer and the Service 
are adversaries may seem counterfactual. After all, aren’t taxpayers, their tax 
lawyers, and the government all working toward the same end—namely, to 
determine the “correct”41 tax treatment of items reflected on the taxpayer’s 
return?42 In theory, the answer to this question should be “yes.” As com-
mentators have observed, the relationship between taxpayers and the Service 
should remain cooperative until they reach the stage of litigation (or pos-
sibly on audit, but only if the revenue agent adopts an adversarial stance).43 
In reality, however, the organized bar has staunchly defended the view that 
the relationship between taxpayers and the Service is adversarial—and not 
cooperative—in nature.44 Taxpayers reify this putative adversarial relationship 
and signal the start of the game whenever they attempt to press their supe-
rior starting position to maximum advantage. The only reason for taxpayers 
to play this game is that they “fear scrutiny by the Service.”45 This fear of 
scrutiny 
indicates that they are taking their tax reporting position based on a belief that the 
Service will not discover the transaction rather than on a good faith belief in its 
merits. This is counter to their duty as taxpayers to fairly make their tax situation 
known to the Service under the self-assessment system.46
The reason the lawyers should have been less zealous in their advocacy for their clients 
in these situations is not simply that they should have sought to preserve the purposes 
of law or morality, but also because, in context (vis-à-vis government agencies with 
relatively limited personnel resources for investigation of corporate wrongdoing), 
these lawyers’ corporate clients were, in some respects, the more powerful entity. At 
the very least, these clients had much more equivalency of resources in terms of their 
ability to evade detection of wrongdoing by government agencies engaged in compli-
ance monitoring and civil enforcement actions.
Susan D. Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical Deliberation, 35 H L. R. 115, 
161 (2006).
41See I.R.C. § 6065 (requiring returns to be signed under penalty of perjury); Reg. 
§§ 1.446-1(a)(4) (“Each taxpayer is required to make a return of his taxable income for each 
taxable year and must maintain such accounting records as will enable him to file a correct 
return.”) (emphasis added), 1.461-1(a)(3) (“Each year’s return should be complete in itself, 
and taxpayers shall ascertain the facts necessary to make a correct return.”) (emphasis added); 
I R S., D’  T, F 1040: U.S. I I T 
R 2 (2006) (“Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and 
accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, they are 
true, correct, and complete.”) (emphasis added).
42Richard Lavoie, Making a List and Checking It Twice: Must Tax Attorneys Divulge Who’s 
Naughty and Nice?, 38 U.C. D L. R. 141, 198 (2004) [hereinafter Lavoie, Making a 
List].
43See Beale, supra note 1, at 648; Prescott, supra note 1, at 730–31; Southworth, supra note 
14, at 910 n.122.
44See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Raising the Ethical Bar for Tax Lawyers: Why We Need Circular 
230, 111 T N (TA) 823, 828–29 (2006) [hereinafter Ventry, Raising the Ethical Bar] 
(describing how tax controversy norms won out over tax planning norms in the debate over the 
ethical obligations of tax lawyers); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
45Lavoie, Making a List, supra note 42, at 199.
46Id.
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The duty to the tax system intervenes to remind tax lawyers that: (1) tax 
compliance is not supposed to be a zero-sum game; and (2) they, like all law-
yers, have an ethical duty not to undermine the integrity of the legal system 
of which they form a part.47 Given the realities of the tax compliance and 
enforcement process, it might therefore be more accurate to say that, when 
the tax lawyer enters gray areas of tax characterization, she is asked to privilege 
her duty to the tax system over her duty of zealous advocacy in an attempt 
to right the relationship between the taxpayer and the Service. Viewed in 
this light, the duty to the tax system serves as a check on the more powerful 
party (here, the taxpayer) in order to prevent her from riding roughshod over 
the less powerful party (here, the Service) to the great detriment of the tax 
system—and, vicariously, other taxpayers.
 The notion that the duty to the tax system rights the relationship between 
the taxpayer and the Service—and thereby fosters confidence in, and shores 
up, our self-assessment system of taxation—underlies the Treasury Depart-
ment’s own articulation of the justification for this duty:48
While it is generally agreed that a practitioner owes a client competence, loyalty and 
confidentiality, it also is recognized that a practitioner has responsibilities to the tax 
system as well. In the normal practitioner-client relationship, both responsibilities 
are recognized and carried out. However, there are situations when this is difficult. 
In those situations, the practitioner is required to decide which obligation prevails 
and, in so doing, may correctly conclude that the obligation to the tax system is 
paramount. To this end, the ability of the IRS to accomplish its mission efficiently 
and effectively depends on reliance on tax practitioners to be fair and honest in their 
dealings with the IRS and to foster confidence by their clients in our tax system and 
in tax compliance.
The area of tax return preparation and advice given with respect to positions on tax 
returns clearly reflects a practitioner’s dual responsibility. A tax return is not a sub-
mission in an adversary proceedings [sic]. Rather, the tax return serves a disclosure, 
reporting and self-assessment function. It is a citizen’s report to the government of 
his or [sic] relevent [sic] activities for the year. To serve its disclosure and assessment 
function, a tax return must be [sic] provide a fair report of matters affecting tax 
liability. The complexities of the tax and the limited number of tax return examina-
tions the IRS is able to perform impose a substantial burden upon the government. 
Hence, the representations made on tax returns must accurately reflect the facts, 
and positions taken on tax returns must be supportable by the law. A practitioner, 
during an engagement with a taxpayer-client, has an affirmative duty to assure that 
these occur.48
47See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. For a more recent discussion that strikes a 
similar chord, see Beale, supra note 1, at 630–33.
48Please note that the passage that follows in the text above is quoted from Infanti, Eyes Wide 
Shut, supra note 19, at 606, with original footnotes altered to comport with this Article.
49Tax Practitioners, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113, 29,113 (Aug. 14, 1986) (proposing changes to 
31 C.F.R. §§ 10.22, 10.34), proposed rules withdrawn, Regulations Governing the Practice of 
Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the 
Internal Revenue Service, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356, 46,356 (Oct. 8, 1992). For the history behind 
these proposed regulations, see Ventry, Filling the Ethical Void, supra note 14.
418 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, No. 2
This passage also raises the issue of the precise nature of the duty that tax 
lawyers owe to the tax system, providing us with a nice segue into a discussion 
of the contours of that duty in the next section.
B.  Contours of the Duty to the Tax System
Commentators also take divergent views concerning the precise nature of the 
tax lawyer’s duty to the tax system. Some commentators see the duty to the 
tax system as having a direct impact on the attorney-client relationship, while 
others see it as entailing special duties for the tax lawyer as a citizen. I discuss 
each of these views separately below.
 1.  A Duty that Directly Impacts the Attorney-Client Relationship
Many commentators share the Treasury Department’s view of this duty and 
see it as a helpful counterweight to the lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy:50
The tax lawyer’s duty to the revenue system has been conceptualized as requiring her 
to “balance the immediate demands of [her] clients against the public’s interest in a 
sound tax system which operates in accord with policy judgments reached through a 
democratic process.”51 For example, in the tax planning context, the goal is to strike 
an appropriate balance between “excessive conservatism and reckless optimism.”52 If 
a tax lawyer’s advice is excessively conservative, she risks “depriving the client of tax 
benefits to which the client is legally entitled.”53 If, on the other hand, a tax lawyer’s 
advice is excessively optimistic, she may not only aid her client in shirking all or a 
portion of the client’s “rightful share of taxation,” but may also erode the overall level 
of compliance with the tax system (and, ultimately, reduce or eliminate the effective-
ness of the tax as a source of government revenue) by contributing to a general sense 
among taxpayers that “others are avoiding their proper shares of taxation.”54
And, in an important step toward righting the relationship between the tax-
payer and the government, it seems that the tax lawyer should undertake the 
task of striking an appropriate balance between excessive conservatism and 
reckless optimism without factoring in the actual likelihood that the Service 
will detect and audit the position that her advice concerns.55
50The following passage is quoted from Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut, supra note 19, at 606-07, 
with original footnotes altered to comport with this Article.
51Galler, supra note 1, at 693.
52Durst, supra note 14, at 1028.
53Id.
54Id.
55See Ames, supra note 14, at 428 (“The lawyer must therefore clearly explain to the client 
that society is relying on the taxpayer’s honesty, and that the lawyer’s integrity requires him or 
her to insist on that honesty.”); id. at 429 (urging a revision of ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 
to clearly provide that, “[w]hen preparing a return or giving advice, the lawyer must always 
assume the return will be audited”); cf. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(d)(2) (“The possibility that a return 
will not be audited or, if audited, that an item will not be raised on audit, is not relevant in 
determining whether the substantial authority standard (or the reasonable basis standard) is 
satisfied.”); 1.6694-2(b)(1) (“In making this determination [that a position has a realistic pos-
sibility of being sustained on its merits], the possibility that the position will not be challenged
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 Where the application of the tax laws is clear, striking the balance between 
excessive conservatism and reckless optimism is easy. In that case, the tax law-
yer can discharge both her duty to the tax system and the duty to her client 
simply by advising the taxpayer to pay the “correct” amount of tax.56 More 
commonly, however, the “correct” amount of tax is unclear and striking the 
balance becomes difficult because the tax lawyer’s duties to the tax system 
and to her client conflict with each other.57 As a result, a tax lawyer does 
not ordinarily experience these two duties as a harmonious whole drawing 
her ineluctably toward helping the client report the “correct” amount of tax; 
rather, she experiences them as opposing forces that pull her in two entirely 
different directions, one client-regarding and the other public-regarding. 
 When conceptualized in this way, the contours of the duty to the tax system 
are inherently ambiguous58 and naturally fraught with difficult ethical ques-
tions that will require the lawyer to bring her own moral judgment to bear 
if she hopes to resolve them.59 But while uncomfortable for the tax lawyer, 
by the Internal Revenue Service (e.g., because the taxpayer’s return may not be audited or 
because the issue may not be raised on audit) is not to be taken into account.”) (please note 
that I.R.C. § 6694 was recently amended by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina 
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246(b), 121 
Stat. 112, 203 (2007), to require an increased level of confidence in return positions, and this 
regulation does not yet reflect that revised standard); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(d)(1) (in determining 
whether a position has a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits, “[t]he possibility 
that a tax return will not be audited, that an issue will not be raised on audit, or that an issue 
will be settled may not be taken into account”); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (indicating that the prior standard applicable to tax lawyers 
had “been construed by many lawyers to support the use of any colorable claim on a tax return 
to justify exploitation of the lottery of the tax return audit selection process,” and adopting in 
its stead a standard that permits a lawyer to advise a taxpayer to take a return position only if 
“there is some realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated”) (emphasis added). But see 
Joel S. Newman, The Audit Lottery: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell?, 86 T N (TA) 1438 (2000) 
(arguing that tax lawyers should be able to inform their clients about the Service’s audit rate; 
however, if the taxpayer acts on that advice by taking an undisclosed return position that does 
not meet the realistic possibility of success standard, then he asserts that the attorney must 
withdraw from the representation to avoid penalties; moreover, if apprising the client of the 
audit rate would automatically subject a lawyer to penalties, then he would not encourage the 
attorney to do so).
56W  ., supra note 14, § 101.2.
57Id.
58See id.; Durst, supra note 14, at 1052; Maguire, supra note 14, at 44; Watson, Legislating 
Morality, supra note 14, at 1207; see also Galler, supra note 1, at 687–88 (discussing how “duty 
to the system” can actually refer to several different distinct duties).
59See M R  P ’ C pmbl. ¶ 9:
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. 
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s responsi-
bilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an 
ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct 
often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these 
Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues
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this ambiguity may be part of what makes the duty to the tax system such a 
potentially effective counterweight to the duty of zealous advocacy. Much like 
the ambiguity that is inherent in the judicially created anti-abuse doctrines 
(for example, substance over form, sham transaction, and step transaction), 
the ambiguity inherent in the duty to the tax system works to the advantage 
of the Service by creating a “penumbra of uncertainty” that should dissuade 
conscientious tax lawyers from advising taxpayers to undertake “transactions 
likely to fall into the gray zone.”60 In other words, when the tax lawyer finds 
herself dealing with questionable tax characterizations in this gray zone, we 
expect her to privilege her duty to the tax system over her opposing duty 
of zealous advocacy, essentially resolving doubts against the taxpayer and in 
favor of the Service.
 When a tax lawyer enters the gray zone, the duty to the tax system will 
sometimes lead to a sub rosa shaping of the advice that she provides to her cli-
ent, with the lawyer silently ruling out certain options because they cross the 
line into what she feels is too risky territory. In other situations, the tax lawyer 
will not completely rule out an option before advising her client, but the duty 
to the tax system will cause the lawyer to attempt to dissuade the client from 
pursuing that option in favor of another that the lawyer feels is less risky. In 
either case, the tax lawyer is discharging what William Simon has termed her 
“professional duty of reflective judgment.”61 Taking into account the realities 
of the enforcement process, the tax lawyer is exercising her ethical discretion 
in the manner that “seem[s] [to her] most likely to promote justice.”62 For 
purposes of this Article, it is worth noting that promoting justice here usu-
ally means privileging the duty to the tax system over the duty of zealous 
advocacy.
 Compounding the general ambiguity of this formulation of the duty to 
the tax system is the fact that the contours of the duty can also shift with 
the changing context of a tax lawyer’s representation of her client. That is 
to say, the duty that a tax lawyer owes to the tax system can vary depending 
on whether she is engaged in general tax planning or return preparation, 
must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment 
guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the law-
yer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within 
the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude 
toward all persons involved in the legal system.
60Lavoie, Gun Slingers, supra note 14, at 48.
61William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 H. L. R. 1083, 1083 
(1988).
62Id. at 1090; see also id. at 1091, 1096–1107.
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representing her client on audit, or representing her client in litigation.63 For 
example, many commentators express the view that any duty to the tax sys-
tem ends as soon as a tax matter reaches litigation because, at that point, the 
duty to see to the proper and effective administration of the tax laws shifts to 
the court.64
 2.  A Duty that Entails a “Public Responsibility”
Some commentators view the duty to the tax system as entailing a certain 
“public responsibility.”65 As Randolph Paul has put it, the tax lawyer “is a 
citizen as well as a tax adviser. [She] is more than the ordinary citizen; [s]he 
is a specially qualified person in one of the most important areas of the pub-
lic interest.”66 Because of her specialized knowledge, a tax lawyer has a duty 
to engage in activities—for example, “speaking, writing, appearing before 
committees”—that aim to produce a “better” tax system, one “that raises the 
necessary revenue and at the same time distributes the required tax burden in 
a way which treats alike those who are similarly situated.”67 Certain of these 
63Even the Model Rules recognize that a lawyer may play one or more of a number of differ-
ent roles that entail different obligations:
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a law-
yer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights and 
obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a 
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of 
honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client’s legal 
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. 
M R  P ’ C pmbl. ¶ 2; see Prescott, supra note 1, at 703–04.
64E.g., Caplin, supra note 14, at 1033; Corneel, Guidelines Second, supra note 14, at 299; 
Ventry, Raising the Ethical Bar, supra note 43, at 828–29; Walters, supra note 14, at 33; Ames, 
supra note 14, at 415; see also Sax et al., supra note 15, at 636 (indicating that ABA Formal 
Opinion 85-352 does not address either a tax lawyer’s ethical duties in negotiations and settle-
ments with the Service or in tax litigation, thus lending credence to the notion that different 
ethical duties attend these different roles); Corneel, Guidelines Third, supra note 14, at 183 
(excluding ethical rules relating to litigation from the scope of the project because those rules 
are the same as apply to other litigation, implying that tax planning, return preparation, and 
audit representation and administrative appeals are contexts that involve different ethical con-
siderations); Galler, supra note 1, at 697–98 (describing how a tax lawyer’s duty to the govern-
ment itself—as adversary or potential adversary—changes depending on whether the lawyer is 
serving in the role of advocate and adviser at the return preparation stage or is serving solely in 
the role of advocate at the litigation stage).
65Caplin, supra note 14, at 1032.
66Paul, supra note 14, at 386.
67Id. at 386–87; see Corneel, Guidelines Second, supra note 14, at 301 (“In addition to rep-
resenting our clients, we should also seek to contribute to improvement of the tax laws and 
their administration.”); Walters, supra note 14, at 25 (“Even among those lawyers who have 
taken the position that the tax practitioner does not owe a dual responsibility, to his client 
and to the Government, there is a recognition that the tax practitioner should face up to some 
responsibility in the development and effective operation of our tax system.”); see also Johnson, 
supra note 14, at 35–37 (exploring the various avenues open to tax lawyers for shaping the law 
outside of the client context). 
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commentators, including Paul, seem to eschew the notion that the duty to 
the tax system can directly impact the attorney-client relationship and instead 
confine it solely to this public responsibility.68 However, others seem to view 
the tax lawyer’s public responsibility as a natural adjunct to fulfilling her duty 
to the tax system within the individual attorney-client relationship.69 
 Notwithstanding the importance of this public aspect of the duty to the tax 
system, my primary focus in this Article is on the potential impact of the duty 
to the tax system on the individual attorney-client relationship. I am trying 
to reach the significant subset of tax lawyers (myself included) who allow the 
duty to the tax system to, at some level, influence the advice that they render 
to clients when the “correct” amount of tax is unclear.70 Thus, maintaining 
the focus on this aspect of the duty to the tax system, I will now turn to the 
task of providing a lesbian and gay perspective on the conventional concep-
tualization of the duty to the tax system.
III.  The Duty to the Tax System: A Lesbian and Gay Perspective
Being grounded in the realities of the tax compliance and enforcement pro-
cess, the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system revolves 
around the expected relationship between the taxpayer and the Service. Con-
ventionally, the taxpayer and the Service are initially presumed to be coopera-
tively striving toward the same end: the correct tax treatment of items on the 
taxpayer’s return. The only reason for a taxpayer to press her natural tactical 
advantages over the Service would be to take questionable (that is, arguably 
incorrect) positions on her return that she does not wish the Service to detect 
and audit. Given the real danger of the taxpayer upsetting the presumptively 
cooperative relationship with the Service by treating it as an adversarial one, 
we attempt to right the relationship between the taxpayer and the Service by 
imposing a duty to the tax system on the taxpayer’s lawyer. By righting the 
relationship in this way, we are able to maintain the integrity of the tax system 
and to preserve taxpayers’ confidence in the system.
Paul’s statement in the text above makes an oblique reference to the tax policy concept of 
“horizontal equity” (i.e., treating those with equal incomes equally). For a deconstruction of 
this concept and critique of its insidious influence on tax scholarship, see Infanti, Tax Equity, 
supra note 22.
68See Paul, supra note 14, at 386.
69See Walters, supra note 14, at 24–25.
70Watson, Legislating Morality, supra note 14, at 1213. The author notes:
If there is a discrete duty to the tax system, the public’s interest in ensuring that the 
federal tax system operates efficiently and fairly should be paramount, and question-
able positions ideally should be resolved in favor of the government. Doubtless, there 
are some practitioners with very high standards who operate under this assumption. 
But this certainly is not true across the board.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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 A lesbian and gay perspective on the conventional conceptualization of the 
duty to the tax system seemingly requires a trip through the looking-glass.71 
For lesbians and gay men, each of the key features of the conventional view 
of the relationship between taxpayers and the Service that underpins the duty 
to the tax system is turned squarely on its head. As I will explain more fully 
below, the relationship between the Service and lesbian and gay taxpayers 
does not begin from a baseline of cooperation, but from a baseline of antago-
nism. Far from working cooperatively toward the end of determining the 
correct tax treatment of items on the taxpayer’s return, the government has 
generally refused to provide meaningful guidance on the tax treatment of 
same-sex couples. And, in the rare instance when it has spoken, the Service’s 
guidance has not necessarily aimed at a fair and honest application of the tax 
laws. Indeed, recent guidance appears to be driven more by ideology than 
by concern with the correct application of the tax laws to same-sex couples. 
Further compounding this adversarial turn is the reversal of the conventional 
power differential between the taxpayer and the Service in the case of lesbians 
and gay men. Instead of the taxpayer starting out with a decided advantage 
over the Service, the Service begins with a decided advantage over lesbian and 
gay taxpayers, who have been placed on the defensive by the government’s 
studied silence on the tax treatment of same-sex couples. Moreover, the Ser-
vice has pressed its advantages over lesbian and gay taxpayers to the point of 
overreaching. 
 In the following two sections of this Part, I will explore how this reversal 
comes about. We will see that it stems from the unique position that lesbians 
and gay men occupy as the only victims of both overt and covert invidious dis-
crimination in the application of the tax laws. In the final section of this Part, 
we will consider the predicament that lesbians and gay men can face when 
the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system is applied to 
their decidedly unconventional relationship with the Service.
A.  Overt Invidious Discrimination in the Application of the Tax Laws
Overtly, Congress engaged in invidious discrimination against lesbians and 
gay men when it enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).72 Section 
three of DOMA provides that:
71See generally Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, in 
L C, A’ A  W  T  L G 119 
(Signet Classic ed. 2000) (1871).
72Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). For a succinct 
argument that DOMA is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because, out of anti-
gay animus, Congress singled out lesbians and gay men for the imposition of an inferior legal 
status, see Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Romer v. 
Evans and Its Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 16 Q L. R. 217 (1996).
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In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, 
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.73
Consequently, the federal government treats same-sex and different-sex rela-
tionships differently for tax purposes, even when state governments—the 
traditional arbiters of marital status for federal tax purposes74—place those 
relationships on the same legal plane.75
 As of this writing, six states have placed same-sex relationships on the same 
legal plane as different-sex relationships: Massachusetts has extended the right 
to marry to same-sex couples and California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont have created alternative regimes (whether 
labeled civil union or domestic partnership) that entail all of the rights and 
obligations of marriage.76 Same-sex couples who marry or enter into a civil 
union or domestic partnership in one of these states are therefore treated 
Of course, DOMA’s constitutionality has been assailed on a number of other grounds as 
well. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Mar-
riages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 B. L. R. 307 (1998) (arguing that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Due Process Clause prohibit Congress from enacting 
DOMA); Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills of Attainder, and the Definition of Punishment: 
On DOMA, the Hawaii Amendment, and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48 S L. 
R. 227 (1998) (arguing that DOMA violates the Bill of Attainder Clause); Mark Strasser, 
Loving the Romer out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U. 
P. L. R. 279 (1997) (arguing that enactment of DOMA exceeds Congress’s power under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, violates the right to interstate travel, and does not meet the 
relevant standard for displacing state domestic relations law).
731 U.S.C. § 7 (2007). 
74“We agree with the government’s argument that under the Code a federal court is bound 
by state law rather than federal law when attempting to construe marital status.” Boyter v. 
Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981); see I.R.C. § 7703. 
75Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 19, at 781 n.32. For those who might counter that 
unmarried different-sex couples are actually in the same position as same-sex couples for fed-
eral tax purposes, I have explained elsewhere:
Unmarried heterosexual couples are likewise treated as no more than tax strangers to 
each other. Because they share the same status, unmarried heterosexual couples are 
subject to the same uncertainties and the same recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments that apply to gay and lesbian couples, which are described more fully in the 
text below. Unmarried heterosexual couples do, however, have one privilege that gay 
and lesbian couples do not—the privilege to choose to get married, have that mar-
riage recognized by the federal government, and avoid all of these problems.
Id.
76C. F. C § 297.5 (West 2007); C. G. S. § 46b-38nn (2007); N.H. R. 
S. A. §§ 457-A:1–6 (2008); N.J. R. S. § 37:1-31 (2007); V. S. A. tit. 15, § 
1204 (2006); 2007 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. No. 99 (Lexis) (effective Jan. 1, 2008); Opinions of the 
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941, 955–57 (Mass. 2003).
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the same as married different-sex couples for state tax purposes, but they are 
treated as “single” strangers for federal tax purposes.77 As Nancy Knauer has 
explained, this differential tax treatment was not an accident; rather, it was 
an act of intentional and purposeful discrimination against lesbians and gay 
men:
The exclusion of same-sex couples from the marital provisions is intentional. As 
a result, there is nothing hidden or covert about the heterosexist bias of the tax 
code. There is no neutral principle at work. The rationale for the exclusion is not 
that same-sex couples do not pool their resources like opposite-sex married couples. 
Instead, the rationale for the exclusion is based on the beliefs that a same-sex couple 
is not a family, that no civilized society has ever countenanced such unions, and that 
our Judeo-Christian heritage forbids them.78
Through the enactment of DOMA, Congress has stigmatized lesbians and 
gay men “by branding their relationships inferior to those of straight couples. 
In effect, the Code at once embodies and perpetuates societal prejudice, dis-
crimination, and hostility toward gays and lesbians by giving such activity the 
imprimatur of the federal government.”79 As we will see more clearly in the 
next section, Congress has clearly marked lesbians and gay men as appropri-
ate targets for hostile treatment by the Service—and even the courts—in tax 
matters.80
77C. G. S. § 46b-38pp (2007); N.H. R. S. A. § 457-A:6 (2008); N.J. 
R. S. § 37:1-32(n) (2007); V. S. A. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(14) (2006); V. S. A. 
tit. 32, § 5812; 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 802 (S.B. 1827) (West);  2007 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. No. 
99, §§ 9(8), 11 (Lexis) (effective Jan. 1, 2008); Dep’t of Revenue, Commonwealth of Mass., 
Tech. Info. Rel. No. 04-17 (July 7, 2004); see infra text accompanying note 82. 
From a procedural perspective, however, same-sex couples are often saddled with additional 
or more complex state tax reporting obligations because many states pattern their own income 
taxes after the federal income tax, which mandates separate (i.e., “single”) filing for same-sex 
couples. See Catherine Martin Christopher, Note, Will Filing Status Be Portable? Tax Implica-
tions of Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 4 P. T R. 137 (2007).
78Knauer, supra note 24, at 233; see also id. at 190 (“Numerous members of Congress 
returned again and again to the cost of providing federal benefits to same-sex partners. The 
effect of DOMA on the marital provisions of the tax code was not an unintended conse-
quence.”); H.R. R. N. 104-664, at 11 n.40 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2905, 2915 (referencing the prepared statement of Lynn D. Wardle, Professor of Law, Brigham 
Young University School of Law); Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the 
H. Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 171 (1996) (pre-
pared statement of Lynn D. Wardle) (specifically enumerating tax benefits as being among the 
federal benefits that would have to be extended to same-sex couples if a state were to legalize 
same-sex marriage).
79Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 19, at 802.
80See Infanti, Deconstructionist Meditation, supra note 23, at 31–40 (describing the courts’ 
treatment of Robert Mueller in his challenges to the application of the tax laws to lesbians and 
gay men).
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B.  Covert Invidious Discrimination in the Application of the Tax Laws
In some situations, the tax effects of DOMA—as written by Congress and 
enforced by the Service—are clear.81 For example, it is clear that DOMA 
prohibits same-sex couples who have married in Massachusetts or entered 
into a civil union or domestic partnership in California, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, New Hampshire, Oregon, or Vermont from checking the “Married 
filing jointly” box under “Filing Status” on their federal income tax returns.82 
In fact, in response to a letter from a conservative, “pro-family” organiza-
tion urging it to investigate and prosecute any same-sex couples who might 
attempt to file joint federal income tax returns, the Service summarized its 
position on the ineligibility of same-sex couples for the marital provisions in 
the Code:
Even though a state may recognize a union of two people of the same sex as a legal 
marriage for the purposes within that state’s authority, that recognition has no effect 
for purposes of federal law. A taxpayer in such a relationship may not claim the 
status of a married person on the federal income tax return.83
Consequently, it is equally clear that same-sex couples cannot claim the ben-
efit of nonrecognition treatment for transfers between spouses under the 
income tax or the benefit of the gift and estate tax marital deductions, which, 
when taken together, allow spouses to transfer property within the couple 
tax-free.84
 In many important areas, however, the tax treatment of same-sex couples 
has been left quite murky. Two factors contribute greatly to this murkiness. 
First, DOMA only tells same-sex couples that they may not look to the rules 
applicable to married couples for guidance; it says absolutely nothing about 
how the Code should be applied to them:
[D]uring the debate over DOMA, Congress debated whether same-sex couples 
should be spouses and never considered what default rules might apply to them 
if they are not treated as spouses. Thus, the message from Congress, as currently 
embedded in the tax laws, is that same-sex couples are not worthy of spousal treat-
ment and, furthermore, their treatment under the tax laws is not even worthy of 
discussion.85
81See supra note 72 for a sampling of the litany of arguments why DOMA is 
unconstitutional.
821 U.S.C. § 7 (2007) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man 
and one woman as husband and wife . . . .”).
83Letter from the Service to Eugene A. Delgaudio, President, Public Advocate of the United 
States, Inc. (June 14, 2004), available at http://www.publicadvocateusa.org/news/article.
php?article=121. For further background on this exchange of letters, see Infanti, Deconstruc-
tionist Meditation, supra note 23, at 22–23.
84See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2007) (“the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife”); I.R.C. §§ 1041, 2056, 2523 (applying only to transfers to a 
“spouse”).
85Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F.L. R. 
465, 493 (2000) [hereinafter Cain, Heterosexual Privilege].
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Second, after the enactment of DOMA, Congress and the Service have held 
true to this latter message. They have utterly failed to provide meaningful 
guidance on how the Code should be applied to same-sex couples,86 some-
times even in the face of direct pleas for such guidance from conscientious 
taxpayers.87
 But, like nature, the Code abhors a vacuum. Accordingly, the void created 
by the federal government’s studied silence regarding the tax treatment of 
same-sex couples did not last long—it quickly swelled with some profoundly 
troubling tax issues. As described below, one of the starkest illustrations of 
this phenomenon concerns the tax treatment of same-sex couples who pool 
their financial resources.
 1.  Contending with the Murkiness
In their relationships, same-sex couples face the same general economic 
choices as different-sex couples. They may decide to pool their finances 
completely, to keep their finances completely separate from each other, or to 
pool certain of their economic resources while keeping others separate.88 Yet, 
despite being faced with the same economic choices, the tax ramifications of 
these couples’ choices depend entirely on their sexual orientation. Different-
86Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 19, at 788–89.
87Patricia A. Cain, Relitigating Seaborn: Taxing the Community Income of California Regis-
tered Domestic Partners, 111 T N (TA) 561, 561–62, 567–68 (2006) [hereinafter Cain, 
Relitigating Seaborn]; Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 19, at 789; Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., No 
Income Splitting for Domestic Partners: How the IRS Erred, 110 T N (TA) 1221, 1221 n.2 
(2006) [hereinafter Ventry, Income Splitting]; see also Anthony C. Infanti, Homo Sacer, Homo-
sexual: Some Thoughts on Waging Tax Guerrilla Warfare, 2 U: H. J.   L 
L 27, 52 n.110 (2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/unbound/
articles/2UNB027-Infanti.pdf [hereinafter Infanti, Homo Sacer] (describing how the Service 
only issued guidance on the reporting of earned income by same-sex couples registered as 
domestic partners in California weeks before the end of the tax filing season and issued that 
guidance in a form that is prohibited by law from being cited as precedent).
The guidance on the tax treatment of the earned income of California registered domestic 
partners described by Cain in Relitigating Seaborn, Infanti in Homo Sacer, and Ventry in 
Income Splitting has recently been incorporated into a publication prepared for taxpayers living 
in community property states. I R S., D’  T, P’ N. 
555, C P 2 (2007). Unfortunately, this guidance is of little real help to 
California registered domestic partners. Like the Defense of Marriage Act, this guidance actu-
ally raises more questions than it answers because it is phrased in the negative: “If you are a 
registered domestic partner in California, the rules discussed in this publication for reporting 
community income do not apply to you.” Id. Simply telling same-sex couples that they will 
not be accorded the same tax treatment as married different-sex couples does nothing to tell 
them what tax rules will apply to their situations and how transactions between the registered 
domestic partners should be reported for tax purposes. For a list of some of the questions that 
this guidance leaves unanswered, see Cain, Relitigating Seaborn, supra, at 567–68.
88For a discussion of pooling by same-sex couples, see Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 
19, at 784 n.42.
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sex married couples can choose whichever arrangement best suits their needs 
without worrying about the tax ramifications. Regardless of the extent to 
which they pool their resources, different-sex married couples are treated as 
a single economic unit for tax purposes and transfers within that unit are, 
therefore, wholly disregarded.89 In contrast, same-sex couples who have mar-
ried or entered into a civil union or domestic partnership are nonetheless 
treated as two separate, “single” economic units, even if they actually pool 
all of their economic resources. This means that, far from being disregarded, 
transactions within a same-sex couple can have serious tax consequences.
 Because transactions within a same-sex couple are not disregarded for 
federal tax purposes, a same-sex couple must annually calculate and docu-
ment their respective contributions to the economic pool and determine the 
amount, if any, of the net transfer from the higher-earning partner to the 
lower-earning partner that results from differing contributions to the pool 
(the net interspousal transfer).90 In practice, this task will be difficult, if not 
impossible, for same-sex couples to accomplish:
The Code essentially requires these couples to keep records documenting every 
penny that they spend, save, or give away to third parties. Every trip to the grocery 
store, the clothing store, and the bank must be documented to determine who spent 
what and on whom . . . . Think for a moment of the mountain of shopping receipts 
that you collect every month. Then think of having to catalogue each of these 
receipts contemporaneously according to what was spent and on whom. Then think 
about having to tally up the total at the end of the year. Then think about having to 
list every one of these transactions on a tax return, showing the particulars of what 
was given, by whom, and to whom. Finally, think about having to find a place to 
store this small mountain of paper for six or more years (depending on the relevant 
tax statute of limitations) in order to provide support for the claimed amount . . . of 
any net interspousal transfer.91
Notwithstanding these difficulties, every same-sex couple is required to docu-
ment the extent of their pooling, even those who do not pool at all. For, with-
out the necessary documentation, the couple will have trouble disproving an 
assertion by the Service either: (1) that they did, in fact, pool their finances; 
or (2) in the case of couples who admit to pooling, that the net interspousal 
transfer was actually larger than claimed by the couple.92 This is important 
89H.R. R. N. 98-432, at 1491 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1134 (“The 
committee believes that, in general, it is inappropriate to tax transfers between spouses. This 
policy is already reflected in the Code rule that exempts marital gifts from the gift tax, and 
reflects the fact that a husband and wife are a single economic unit.”); see I.R.C. §§ 1041, 
2056, 2523.
90Because differing contributions to the economic pool will usually be due to differing wage 
levels, I refer to the partner who contributes more to the pool as the “higher-earning” partner 
and to the partner who contributes less to the pool as the “lower-earning” partner.
91Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 19, at 798 (footnotes omitted).
92See id.
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because, in federal tax matters, the burden of proof is placed on the taxpayer 
(here, the same-sex couple), and the Service benefits from an initial presump-
tion that its own position is correct.93
 Once a same-sex couple has managed this Sisyphean task, they must then 
turn to the enigmatic task of characterizing the net interspousal transfer both 
for income and for gift tax purposes.94 For income tax purposes, the amount 
of the net interspousal transfer may be treated as income to the higher-earn-
ing partner and as one of the following in the hands of the lower-earning 
partner: (1) an excludible gift, (2) an excludible support payment, (3) taxable 
income, or (4) some combination of the above.95 For gift tax purposes, the 
amount of the net interspousal transfer may be treated as: (1) a taxable gift, 
(2) “a non-taxable payment made in exchange for rendering domestic services 
or for furnishing some other consideration in money or money’s worth,” (3) 
a nontaxable support payment, or (4) some combination of the above.96 It is 
worth noting that there is no requirement that the net interspousal transfer 
be treated consistently for income and for gift tax purposes, which only serves 
to multiply the number of potential characterizations.97
 Same-sex couples are thus faced with a whole spectrum of possible combi-
nations of characterizations for a single year’s net interspousal transfer, with 
widely varying tax consequences. At one end of this spectrum, we find the 
most benign characterizations; for example, the same-sex couple might take 
the position that the net interspousal transfer constitutes a support payment. 
This is beneficial because the lower-earning partner could exclude the sup-
port payment from her gross income and the support payment would not be 
taxable for gift tax purposes. This would result in, at most, a single layer of 
tax—in the hands of the higher-earning partner. This benign characterization 
is roughly equivalent to the treatment that is afforded to different-sex married 
couples, for whom net interspousal transfers are essentially disregarded.98 At 
the other end of the spectrum, we find the most punitive of characteriza-
tions; for example, the Service might assert that the net interspousal transfer 
should “be characterized as income to both partners for income tax purposes 
and as a taxable gift from the higher-earning partner to the lower-earning 
partner for gift tax purposes. Consequently, a portion of the income of the 
higher-earning partner might be subject to triple taxation.”99 In between these 




97See id. at 787.
98See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1041, 2056, 2523. I say roughly equivalent because of the differing tax 
rates that apply to married couples and singles. See I.R.C. § 1.
99Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 19, at 788.
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two ends of the spectrum are combinations of characterizations that might 
be considered merely malignant, because they involve some form of double 
(rather than triple) taxation of the couple; for example, the net interspousal 
transfer might be considered income to both the higher- and lower-earning 
partners for income tax purposes but as a nontaxable payment for services for 
gift tax purposes.
 Despite this dizzying (not to mention frightening) array of possibilities, 
neither Congress nor the Service has provided same-sex couples with guidance 
on how to characterize net interspousal transfers for federal tax purposes.100 
Coming, as it does, in the face of decades of discussion by commentators 
concerning the uncertain tax treatment of same-sex couples, this silence is 
deafening.101 What makes this silence even more troubling is that, once again, 
“the tax laws place the burden on gay and lesbian couples to prove that their 
chosen treatment is correct . . . [and further] attach a presumption of correct-
ness to whatever treatment the [Service] deems appropriate—after the fact 
and without any advance public notice.”102 Even so, those same-sex couples 
who, in retrospect, erred in choosing the “correct” tax treatment for their net 
interspousal transfers can find themselves subject to civil or criminal penalties 
(or both), on top of any additional tax and interest that they might owe.103 
 When the federal government’s silence is coupled in this way with the spec-
ter of confiscatory levels of taxation along with civil or criminal penalties (or 
both), the Code begins to take on the appearance of a sodomy statute. It 
doles out potentially harsh punishment for lesbians and gay men who dare to 
couple, and it creates a clear incentive for lesbians and gay men to retreat to 
the “safety”104 of the closet—by filing returns with the Service that avoid at all 
costs making any connection between one partner in a same-sex couple and 
the other.105
 2.  Contending with So-Called Guidance
In the rare instance when the federal government does speak, it is not necessar-
ily to illuminate the “correct” answer for same-sex couples. A telling example 
is found in recent guidance on the federal tax treatment of same-sex couples 
who are registered as domestic partners in California. Beginning on January 
100Id. at 789.
101See, e.g., Cain, Heterosexual Privilege, supra note 85, at 493; see also id. at 491–94; Patri-
cia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 T. J.L.  S 97 (1991); 
Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. C. R. L.  W’ S. 471, 475–79 (1997); 
Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 D. U. L. R. 359, 373–93 (1995); 
Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 19, at 783–804; Knauer, supra note 24, at 165–84; Bruce 
Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA 
L. R. 1240 passim (1980).
102Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 19, at 790.
103Id. at 790–800.
104See id. at 771 (describing how the closet is far from being a “safe” place).
105Id. at 800–03.
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1, 2005, domestic partners began to be subject to that state’s community 
property laws, which accord each partner a one-half interest in all property 
acquired during the domestic partnership while domiciled in California.106 
The extension of the community property laws to domestic partners natu-
rally raised the question whether the Service would allow domestic partners 
to split their earned income for federal tax purposes, as do married different-
sex couples subject to California’s community property laws.107
 An answer to this question was sought some seventeen months before reg-
istered domestic partners would have had to file their first federal income 
tax returns with respect to a taxable year in which they would be covered by 
California’s community property laws. In November 2004, attorney Donald 
Read, with the assistance of tax professor Pat Cain, prepared and submit-
ted a proposed Revenue Ruling on the question to the Treasury Department 
for its consideration.108 The proposed Revenue Ruling adopted the income-
splitting approach in reliance on the longstanding Supreme Court precedent 
of Poe v. Seaborn.109 In that decision, which hinged on the spouses’ property 
rights under state law (and not on their marital status as such), the Court 
held that, because each spouse owns one-half of the other’s earned income 
under state law, the earned income of the community must be split equally 
between the spouses for federal income tax purposes.110 Despite the pressing 
need for public guidance on this issue, the Treasury Department and the Ser-
vice remained silent for more than fifteen months after receiving Read and 
Cain’s submission.111
 Finally, on February 24, 2006, the Service spoke, but “[i]t spoke in a whis-
per.”112 On that date, the Chief Counsel’s Office issued a memorandum in 
which it opined that California registered domestic partners must each report 
their earned income separately because, it claimed, Poe v. Seaborn applies 
only to married couples.113 This opinion came late—only a few short weeks 
before the April 15 deadline for filing the first federal income tax returns 
with respect to a taxable year in which domestic partners were covered by 
California’s community property laws. Yet, “[f ]or some undisclosed reason, 
the memorandum was not made public along with other IRS announcements 
released that Friday, but instead was released the following Monday, February 
106C. F. C §§ 297.5(a), (k), 751, 760 (West 2007).
107See United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931) (per curiam).
108Donald H. Read, Attorney Offers Draft Revenue Ruling Affecting Domestic Partners (2004), 
available at LEXIS, 2004 TNT 227-31.
109282 U.S. 101 (1930).
110Id. at 118.
111Cain, Relitigating Seaborn, supra note 87, at 562.
112Id.
113G.C.M. 2006-08-038 (Feb. 24, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/ 
0608038.pdf.
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27.”114 Commentators roundly criticized this “guidance”115 for being “unper-
suasive, historically inaccurate, and ultimately indefensible.”116 They pointed 
out that, as mentioned above, Poe v. Seaborn “had everything to do with 
the principle of ownership under community property law and very little to 
do with marriage.”117 Indeed, “marriage, per se, had nothing to do with the 
Supreme Court’s family tax jurisprudence in the 1920s and 1930s.”118 At the 
time,
the Court was exclusively concerned with principles of ownership on one hand, 
and management and control on the other. In fact, “marriage” informed the Court’s 
analysis only to the extent that rights and obligations under community property 
law—as well as any attendant tax advantages—were reserved for married couples 
in 1930.119
Given this harsh criticism and the fact that the Chief Counsel’s Office makes 
an error of interpretation that no decent second-year law student should 
make,120 one can only surmise that this guidance was driven more by ideol-
ogy than by objective legal analysis aimed at ascertaining the correct applica-
114Cain, Relitigating Seaborn, supra note 87, at 562. As mentioned above, this guidance was 
recently incorporated in a publication prepared by the Service for taxpayers in community 
property states. See supra note 87.
115I am not really sure that you can truly call something “guidance” when it is issued in a 
form that is prohibited by law from being cited as precedent. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3); see also 
G.C.M. 2006-08-038 (Feb. 24, 2006) (“In accordance with § 6110(k)(3) this advice may not 
be used or cited as precedent.”).
116Ventry, Income Splitting, supra note 87, at 1221; see Cain, Relitigating Seaborn, supra note 
87, at 566–67.
117Ventry, Income Splitting, supra note 87, at 1224; see Cain, Relitigating Seaborn, supra note 
87, at 567.
118Ventry, Income Splitting, supra note 87, at 1224.
119Id.; see Cain, Relitigating Seaborn, supra note 87, at 567.
120Cain, Relitigating Seaborn, supra note 87, at 567.
To support [its] conclusion the IRS cites one fact: “The case law relating to income-
splitting in community property states has always arisen solely in the context of 
spouses.”
. . .
. . . Regarding the cited fact, it is both irrelevant and wrong. If limited to the question 
whether community income can be split because of the state community property 
law rules, then, yes, of course, that specific question has arisen only in cases involving 
spouses. That is because before 2005 no state had ever extended community property 
rights to anyone other than spouses. That reasoning is similar to an example I often 
use with first-year law students to help them understand the ratio decidendi of a case. 
Just because the first three tort liability cases in a jurisdiction find the driver of a red 
automobile negligent does not mean that the negligence rule is limited to the drivers 
of red cars. The color of the car is irrelevant. Similarly, the spousal status in Seaborn is 
irrelevant. It is the vested nature of the right that is given to the spouses by the state 
law that is the ratio decidendi of the case.
Id.
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tion of the tax laws to the earned income of California registered domestic 
partners.121
 3.  Contending with Impossible Burdens
In its interactions with lesbian and gay taxpayers, the Service has also taken 
advantage of the nearly impossible burden placed on same-sex couples to 
document whether, and if so, to what extent, they pool their finances. Pat 
Cain provides evidence of this behavior in a series of narratives included in a 
piece that she contributed to a symposium on the estate tax.122 Cain obtained 
these narratives “from lawyers and accountants who have represented gay and 
lesbian clients in estate tax audits.”123 To maintain confidentiality, she “either 
elaborated on or amalgamated the specific facts from individual cases.”124 The 
two narratives that are directly relevant to the instant discussion are short 
enough to reproduce in full:
Alice and Barb are a lesbian couple in Ohio. They had lived together for over forty 
years when Alice died. The auditing agent took the position that since Alice was 
the wealthy partner, everything she paid for over the forty years that benefited Barb 
was an adjustable [sic] taxable gift. Thus, Alice’s ownership of the couple’s residence 
which was used by Barb created an adjusted taxable gift. Vacation trips for the two 
of them paid out of Alice’s funds created an adjusted taxable gift. Entertainment 
121In discussing the errors in the Service’s analysis, Ventry observes that: 
[T]he IRS’s analysis suggests that ownership of domestic partnership income 
ends up in one or the other partner not by operation of law, but under some other 
(as yet, unexplained) theory. By gift? By contract? It is impossible to tell from the 
memorandum. I suspect the sleight of hand derives from the awareness that if the 
IRS acknowledged ownership interests for domestic partners on a par with married 
couples under California community property law, it would have to treat—and tax—
the two groups the same.
Ventry, Income Splitting, supra note 87, at 1225.
It is worth noting that this is not the only area in which the Bush administration has resisted 
enforcing laws that benefit lesbians and gay men. For example, the Bush administration has 
been less than enthusiastic about enforcing employment discrimination protections afforded 
to lesbian and gay federal employees and, through executive order, has actually ended the 
unequivocal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the granting 
of security clearances that the Clinton Administration had put in place. See Christopher Lee, 
Groups Applaud Discrimination Ban, W. P, Apr. 10, 2004, at A3 (discussing the admin-
istration’s resistance to enforcing prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation for federal employees). Compare Memorandum from Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant 
to the President for Nat’l Sec. Affairs, Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for 
Access to Classified Info., to William Leonard, Dir. Info. Sec. Oversight Office, Guideline D: 
Sexual Behavior ¶ 12 (Dec. 29, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/guidelines.
html, with Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 3.1(c)–(d), 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 40,250 (Aug. 2, 1995). 
For further discussion, see A C. I, E L  G  L 
( T W C A T), at ch. 5 (2007).
122Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 C. S. L. R. 677, 
696–97 (2000) [hereinafter Cain, Death Taxes].
123Id. at 696.
124Id.
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expenses and meals at fancy restaurants—all items of joint consumption—were pro-
posed as adjusted taxable gifts. Although the case was finally settled, the audit lasted 
over two years.
Carl and Dan are a gay male couple in California. They owned all their property 
as joint tenants and considered it “community property.”125 The property included 
real estate and joint checking accounts and a joint CD. They purchased some of the 
property twenty years ago. Carl was earning slightly more than Dan at the time of 
Carl’s death. The agent asked for proof of Dan’s original contribution to every piece 
of joint property. Dan had not retained cancelled checks for twenty years, but he 
did have tax returns. He was able to show that he made enough money to enable 
him to cover half the down the [sic] payment for the property purchased twenty 
years ago. On the more recent purchases, Dan was eventually able to produce can-
celled checks to account for 40% of the funds needed for the down payment. Data 
on the bank accounts varied. The agent asked for proof of equal contribution to 
the mortgage payments. Dan had no cancelled checks to the mortgage company, 
but was able to show some cancelled checks to Carl which appeared to be partial 
reimbursements. They had split the interest deduction and property tax deduction 
equally on their tax returns over the years. Again the case was ultimately settled, but 
the taxpayer’s representative who shared this story with me says she will never allow a 
gay or lesbian client to own property jointly. Even if they can substantiate contribu-
tions, the emotional toll is not worth the benefit of avoiding probate or reaping the 
benefits of Proposition 13, which is also an issue for nonspousal property owners 
in California.126
The stories of Alice and Barb and Carl and Dan, illustrate the ways in which 
the Service uses its hefty procedural advantages—that is: (1) the impossible 
recordkeeping burden imposed on same-sex couples, (2) the couples’ result-
ing difficulties in carrying the burden of going forward with evidence (that is, 
rebutting the presumption of correctness that attaches to the Service’s deter-
mination), and (3) the couples’ further difficulties in ultimately carrying the 
burden of proof that is placed on them127—to the detriment of lesbian and 
gay taxpayers.
C.  Summarizing Our Predicament
The relationship between lesbian and gay taxpayers and the Service looks 
nothing like the (now, clearly) heteronormative view of the taxpayer-Service 
relationship that underpins the conventional conceptualization of the duty 
to the tax system. Far from finding themselves in a presumptively coopera-
tive relationship, lesbian and gay taxpayers must contend with a federal gov-
125Please note that this narrative pre-dates the creation of the California domestic partner-
ship registry. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 588 (West). As discussed earlier, California actually 
extended its community property laws to cover registered domestic partnerships. See supra note 
105 and accompanying text.
126Cain, Death Taxes, supra note 122, at 696 (footnote omitted).
127For a discussion of the difference between the presumption of correctness or burden of 
going forward with evidence and the burden of proof, see M I. S, IRS P-
  P ¶¶ 1.05[2][b], 7B.11[2][a] (2d ed. Supp. 2002).
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ernment that has already declared itself openly hostile to them. The federal 
government has enacted legislation that overtly discriminates against same-
sex couples; has generally refused to provide guidance on the tax treatment 
of same-sex couples in areas left unclear by that legislation; has provided 
unsound, ideologically-motivated guidance when it has spoken; and has used 
its tactical advantages to persecute lesbian and gay taxpayers. In addition, far 
from having the upper hand in this relationship, lesbian and gay taxpayers 
find themselves constantly on the defensive. Furthermore, their only protec-
tion from an empowered and overreaching federal government is not really a 
form of protection at all, but just additional punishment: Lesbians and gay 
men can most effectively counteract the Service’s advantages by retreating 
into the closet; that is, by effacing all references to their relationship from 
their tax returns and playing the audit lottery.128 As a result, what heterosexual 
taxpayers experience as a distinct tactical advantage in their dealings with 
the Service, lesbian and gay taxpayers experience as a self-inflicted form of 
punishment that merely substitutes for a more humiliating, publicly-inflicted 
punishment.129
 Now, just imagine what would happen if a tax lawyer who scrupulously 
fulfills her duty to the tax system when representing conventional (that is, 
heterosexual) taxpayers were to decide that she must do likewise in her repre-
sentation of lesbian and gay taxpayers. In all likelihood, this tax lawyer would 
quickly encounter the conflicting pull between her duty to the tax system and 
her duty of zealous advocacy, if only because the woefully inadequate level 
of guidance from Congress and the Service on the tax treatment of same-sex 
couples causes so many transactions entered into by these couples to fall into 
the “gray zone.” To resolve doubts in favor of the Service in this enlarged gray 
area—doubts that, by the way, the Service has itself deliberately helped to 
create—would risk doing serious harm to the tax lawyer’s lesbian and gay cli-
ents. In this regard, let us return to the example of characterizing a same-sex 
couple’s net interspousal transfer. On any scale of “questionable” positions, 
the least questionable (and, from the perspective of strictly applying the con-
ventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system, the most accept-
able) positions will tend to be those involving at least double, if not triple, 
taxation of a same-sex couple’s income. On this same scale, the most ques-
tionable positions will tend to be those involving any characterization that 
results in a single level of taxation and, therefore, places the same-sex couple’s 
tax treatment on a par with that of a different-sex married couple. In this 
context, resolving doubts in favor of the Service makes the tax lawyer nothing 
less than an accessory to invidious discrimination. Moreover, the possibility 
that the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system might 
128See Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 19, at 803.
129See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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shape the tax lawyer’s advice entirely sub rosa—in other words, without the 
lesbian or gay client even knowing that her lawyer has put a thumb firmly on 
the Service’s side of the scale—only makes the conventional conceptualiza-
tion that much more insidious.
IV.  Seeing the Duty to the Tax System in a Different Light
Given this predicament, the question then becomes whether the duty to the 
tax system has any role to play in a tax lawyer’s representation of her lesbian 
and gay clients. I believe that it does, but only if we eschew unthinking appli-
cation of the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system 
in favor of a critical reconstruction of it. To this end, this Part deconstructs 
the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system in an effort 
to open the necessary ethical space for crafting an alternative view of that 
duty—one that better suits the representation of lesbian and gay clients than 
does the conventional conceptualization.
A.  Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System
In discussions of the duty to the tax system, as in discussions of a lawyer’s 
general duties to the legal system,130 commentators often speak of the duty 
as being necessary to maintain the “integrity” of the tax system.131 This link 
between the duty to the tax system and the system’s perceived integrity is both 
interesting and quite revealing. To understand why, we will need first briefly 
to look at the meaning and origin of the word “integrity” and then consider 
whether the current treatment of lesbians and gay men under the tax laws 
contributes to—or, conversely, erodes—the integrity of our tax system.
 In its entry for the word “integrity,” the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) 
includes two different senses of the word: a general sense and a moral sense. 
The OED generally defines “integrity” as “[t]he condition of having no part 
or element taken away or wanting; undivided or unbroken state; material 
wholeness, completeness, entirety.”132 In a similar (yet alternative) formula-
tion, it defines “integrity” as “[t]he condition of not being marred or violated; 
unimpaired or uncorrupted condition; original perfect state; soundness.”133 
Following these entries for the general definition of “integrity,” the OED 
includes the moral sense of the word, which it defines as “[s]oundness of 
moral principle; the character of uncorrupted virtue, esp. in relation to truth 
and fair dealing; uprightness, honesty, sincerity.”134 The OED further indicates 
130See supra text accompanying note 12.
131See, e.g., Beale, supra note 1, at 601, 609, 661; Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut, supra note 19, at 
609–10; Lavoie, Gunslingers, supra note 14, at 78 n.97, 79; Thrower, supra note 14; Ames, 
supra note 14, at 413; Southworth, supra note 14, at 891, 909.
1321 O E D 1455 (Compact ed. 1971).
133Id.
134Id.
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that the word “integrity” can be traced back to the Latin “integritās,” which 
connotes “wholeness, entireness, completeness, integrity, chastity, purity.”135
 In keeping with this Latin origin that intertwines both the general and the 
moral senses of the word, commentators seem to employ these two senses in 
tandem when they speak of the “integrity” of the tax system. Drawing first 
upon the moral sense of “integrity,” commentators worry that tax lawyers’ 
facilitation of overly aggressive behavior on the part of taxpayers will under-
mine public confidence in the fair, honest, and upright application of the tax 
laws. Then drawing upon the general sense of “integrity,” commentators posit 
that, failing this public confidence, aggressive behavior can only be expected 
to spread and, eventually, to undermine the soundness of the tax system by 
impairing its ability to collect the revenue that is necessary for the govern-
ment to function. Notwithstanding their use of both senses of the word in 
these discussions, commentators plainly privilege the moral sense of the word 
“integrity” by treating the absence of public confidence in the fair, honest, 
and upright application of the tax laws as the predicate for their worries about 
the potential impairment of the tax system’s soundness (that is, its “integrity” 
in the general sense).136
 Acknowledging the importance of the moral dimension of the “integrity” 
of the tax system, let us now reflect on whether the application of the tax laws 
to lesbians and gay men contributes to—or, conversely, erodes—the percep-
tion of our tax system as fair, honest, and upright. Based on the extended 
discussion in Part III above, I trust that you will agree that targeting lesbians 
and gay men for explicitly inferior treatment, setting them adrift on a sea of 
potential tax characterizations for routine transactions (and, when providing 
them some direction, doing so in a way that advances ideology rather than 
the “correct” application of the tax laws), and using hefty tactical advantages 
to selectively persecute lesbians and gay men is, if anything, the antithesis of 
the fair, honest, and upright application of the tax laws. Moreover, if “what 
counts as justice in taxation cannot be determined without considering how 
government allocates its resources,”137 then the picture only becomes more 
disturbing when we look at what the federal government does with the tax 
dollars that it extorts from lesbians and gay men.138 The federal government 
uses those dollars to: (1) deny legal recognition to same-sex relationships for 
all purposes of federal law (and not just tax purposes) under the so-called 
135Id.
136Cf. Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 
25 V. T R. 671, 747 (2006) (“[T]ax policy is one of the most telling indicators of the 
nation’s true moral compass . . . .”).
137L M  T N, T M  O: T  J 14 
(2002).
138The list of examples that follows in the text above is adapted from Infanti, Tax Equity, 
supra note 22, at 1253-54.
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Defense of Marriage Act—an injunction that has been taken so far as to deny 
a lesbian U.S. citizen a passport because her application listed not her maiden 
name, but her name as changed on her marriage license when she married her 
partner in Massachusetts;139 (2) require those whose same-sex relationships 
are legally recognized under state law to incur unnecessary legal and other 
expenses in an effort to replicate that legal recognition in a way that will be 
recognized by other states, again because of the Defense of Marriage Act;140 
(3) until 2002, prevent the District of Columbia from implementing the 
domestic partnership regime that it had enacted in 1992;141 (4) amend the 
District of Columbia’s Human Rights Act to allow Georgetown University 
to refuse to recognize lesbian and gay student groups despite a court ruling 
to the contrary;142 (5) actively engage in employment discrimination against 
lesbians and gay men through its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy;143 and (6) 
provide rather precarious protections against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation to its other employees.144 Thus, far from contributing to 
the fair, honest, and upright application of our tax laws, the federal govern-
ment actively erodes the integrity of the tax system by using the tax laws to 
engage in invidious discrimination against lesbians and gay men.
 It is well established in American society that neither individuals nor the 
government should engage in such invidious discrimination. With respect to 
the government, the abnegation of invidious discrimination is most clearly 
and directly expressed in the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution, which guarantees all persons “the equal protection of the laws” and 
which has been construed by the courts to bind all levels of our govern-
ment.145 This abnegation is rooted in the Golden Rule (that is, “do unto oth-
ers as you would have them do unto you”),146 which most individuals aspire 
1391 U.S.C. § 7 (2007); Dianne Williamson, Gay Right Springs a Leak, W T.  
G, Mar. 4, 2007, at B1. For further discussion, see I, supra note 121, at ch. 6.
14028 U.S.C. § 1738C (2007). For further discussion, see I, supra note 121, at chs. 
6–8.
141Compare District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-96, 115 
Stat. 923, 950 (2001), with District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
102-382, 106 Stat. 1422, 1422 (1992).
142District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-168, § 141, 103 Stat. 
1267, 1284 (1989) (codified at D.C. C § 2-1402.41(3) (2007)).
14310 U.S.C. § 654 (2007). For further discussion, see I, supra note 121, at ch. 4.
144See supra note 121.
145U.S. C. amend. XIV, § 1. (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.”); see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (hold-
ing that the guarantee of equal protection applies to the federal government as well); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (same).
146See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (“Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority 
to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, No. 2
 DECONSTRUCTING THE DUTY TO THE TAX SYSTEM 439
to follow in their daily lives147 and which forms a part of religious traditions 
from around the world, including Buddhism,148 Christianity,149 Confucian-
ism,150 Hinduism,151 Islam,152 and Judaism.153 The abnegation of invidious 
discrimination can even be detected in various strains of philosophy, includ-
ing Aristotle’s statement that “we should behave to our friends ‘as we should 
wish them to behave to us’”154 and Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative: 
“Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law.”155 
 With moral dictates set firmly against the federal government’s treatment 
of its lesbian and gay taxpayers, the duty to the tax system begins to take on 
an entirely different cast. It should by now be clear that the conventional 
conceptualization of the duty to the tax system harms not only lesbians and 
gay men but also the tax system itself. As discussed earlier, a tax lawyer who 
adheres to the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system in 
the representation of lesbian and gay clients may harm her clients by facilitat-
ing the federal government’s immoral (if not illegal) invidious discrimination 
against them.156 At the same time, by dint of her role as accessory to this dis-
147Indeed, Jonathan Haidt, a moral psychologist at the University of Virginia, ascribes the 
ubiquity of this moral rule to the evolutionary process, because the Golden Rule and other 
moral limits on selfishness make it possible for humans to live in groups. See Nicholas Wade, Is 
“Do unto Others” Written into Our Genes?, N.Y. T, Sept. 18, 2007, at D1.
148T U¯: S B   B 87–88 (Peter Masefield trans., Oxford: 
Pali Text Society 1994) (“Having explored all quarters with the mind, one would simply not 
attain that dearer than the self in any place; thus is the self dear separately to others—therefore 
one desiring self should not harm another.”).
149Luke 6:31 (King James) (“And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them 
likewise.”); id. 10:27 (“And he answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy 
heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor 
as thyself.”); Matthew 7:12 (King James) (“Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men 
should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.”); id. 22:39 (“And 
the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.”).
150C, T A 176 (David Hinton trans., Counterpoint 1998) (“Adept Kung 
asked: ‘Is there any one word that could guide a person through-out life?’ The Master replied: 
‘How about ‘shu’: never impose on others what you would not choose for yourself?’”).
15111 T M  K-D V § CXIII, at 240 (Pratap Chan-
dra Roy trans., Oriental Publ’g. Co. 1962) (“One should never do that to another which one 
regards as injurious to one’s own self. This, in brief, is the rule of Righteousness.”).
152M H H, T L  M 486 (Isma’il Ragi A. al Faruqi 
trans., N. Am. Trust Publ’ns 8th ed. 1976) (“You will neither inflict nor suffer inequity.”).
153Leviticus 19:18 (King James) (“Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the 
children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.”). 
154John A. Miller, Rationalizing Injustice: The Supreme Court and the Property Tax, 22 
H L. R. 79, 133 n.202 (1993) (quoting D L, L  E 
P, bk. V, § 21 (R.D. Hicks trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1950)). 
155I K, F   M  M 44 (Lewis White Beck 
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ’g 1969) (1785).
156See supra Part III.C.
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criminatory treatment, the tax lawyer acts contrary to the interests of the tax 
system itself, eroding the very integrity that discharging her duty to the tax 
system is supposed to protect and preserve. 
 The dual harm (that is, to the client and to the tax system) wreaked by the 
reflexive application of the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the 
tax system reveals the possibility that there may be more of an alignment than 
an opposition of a tax lawyer’s client-regarding and public-regarding duties 
in the context of representing lesbian and gay taxpayers. In this context, it 
becomes possible to imagine an alternative conceptualization of the duty to 
the tax system—one which exists in harmony with, rather than in opposition 
to, the duty of zealous advocacy. This alternative view, which I develop fur-
ther in the next section, would allow a tax lawyer simultaneously to protect 
her lesbian and gay clients from harm and to discharge her obligation to 
safeguard the integrity of the tax system, all by actively preventing abuse by 
an overreaching federal government.
B.  Reconstructing the Duty to the Tax System
The first step toward reconceptualizing the duty to the tax system in this way 
involves revisiting the description of the contours of that duty in Part II.B. 
One of the first things that I noted there about the duty to the tax system 
is its ambiguity. The duty to the tax system clearly means different things 
to different people. For many, it directly affects the advice that a tax lawyer 
provides to her clients. For others, however, it does not directly affect the 
attorney-client relationship, but merely requires the tax lawyer, as a citizen, to 
use her training to work toward the improvement of the tax system. Even for 
those who subscribe to the view that the duty to the tax system can directly 
impact the attorney-client relationship, it is difficult to define precisely when 
or how the duty to the tax system ought to be privileged over the duty of zeal-
ous advocacy.157 Consequently, if one thing is clear about the duty to the tax 
system, it is that the contours of that duty are far from unyielding. Given the 
tractability of the duty to the tax system, there is no good reason why we can-
not carefully reshape the contours and content of that duty to fit more closely 
the needs of tax lawyers representing lesbian and gay clients.158
157See supra Part II.B.
158It is worth underscoring here that this discussion does not strictly concern the question 
whether tax lawyers have a duty to obey the law; thus, for example, I am not arguing that 
tax lawyers should advise same-sex couples to file joint federal income tax returns—in clear 
contravention of DOMA—if they would benefit from the marriage bonus. Nevertheless, it 
is possible that a tax lawyer’s interpretation of how the tax laws apply to her lesbian and gay 
clients—when coupled with reliance on the audit lottery to avoid detection—might, in certain 
situations, amount to a justifiable nullification of the tax laws. See William H. Simon, Should 
Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 W.  M L. R. 217, 250–51 (1996); see generally David 
Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon, 38 W.  M L. R. 
255 (1996); W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 C. L. R. 363 (2004); David B. 
Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey 
the Law, 38 W.  M L. R. 269 (1996).
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 Having recognized that the duty to the tax system is malleable, we must 
next decide how we will reshape the contours of that duty to make it more 
closely fit our present needs. In this endeavor, we should avoid the trap of 
formalism—an error that, ironically, the duty to the tax system is thought to 
help remedy, especially in the area of tax shelters.159 What I mean to say is that 
we should not conceive of the duty to the tax system as narrowly running to 
the Service—the party whose lack of information and resources is normally 
used to justify the imposition of the duty and whom we usually consider to be 
the obligee of the duty. Otherwise, we would find ourselves reshaping the duty 
to the tax system for the benefit of the party who, in this context, is actively 
working to undermine the integrity of the tax system. Instead, we should 
recall the words of those commentators who remind us that the duty is not 
owed to a particular government agency or to some disembodied “system,” 
but to all “citizens who ascribe value to a well-functioning tax system.”160 By 
avoiding the trap of formalism, we can more appropriately focus our efforts 
on reshaping the duty to the tax system in a way that restores the system’s 
integrity—and, correlatively, returns it to proper functioning order—for the 
benefit of all of us, both gay and straight.
 To begin the process of restoring the integrity of the tax system for the ben-
efit of all of us will require tax lawyers to counter the federal government’s use 
of the tax laws as a tool for invidious discrimination against lesbians and gay 
men. In other words, a tax lawyer who truly wishes to strive for the fair, hon-
est, and upright application of the tax laws will refuse to be made an accom-
plice to the government’s invidious discrimination against her lesbian and gay 
clients. In the many areas where the law is unclear, she will resolve any and all 
doubts in favor of her clients, adopting whatever tax characterization does her 
clients the least harm possible, and she will encourage her clients to take full 
advantage of the audit lottery in doing so. She will help her clients to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the government’s discriminatory application of 
the tax laws as well as the soundness of ideologically driven misinterpretations 
of those laws. She will use every procedural device and failing of the system to 
her clients’ advantage in an effort to prevent the Service from profiting from 
its own tactical advantages vis-à-vis lesbian and gay taxpayers. In short, to 
discharge her duty to the tax system and contribute to restoring the integrity 
of that system, the tax lawyer will treat the Service as a real adversary at every 
stage of representation (that is, from early tax planning to return preparation 
to audit and finally on to litigation), and, accordingly, she will zealously advo-
cate on behalf of her lesbian and gay clients from the start to the finish of the 
representation.161
159E.g., Lavoie, Gunslingers, supra note 14, at 79.
160Southworth, supra note 14, at 912.
161See Carle, supra note 40, at 139 (“[L]awyers for clients with substantially less power—in 
other words, lawyers representing ‘underdogs’ vis a vis powerful interests—should be guided 
by the ethical principle of zealous, client-centered representation.”).
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 To fulfill her public responsibility as a citizen with special knowledge,162 
the tax lawyer can also lobby for the passage of, as well as educate others 
about, proposed legislation that is designed to eliminate or, at the very least, 
to mitigate the discrimination against lesbians and gay men that is currently 
embedded in our tax laws.163 In some cases, however, a tax lawyer may eschew 
such traditional approaches to battling the imbricated pattern of discrimina-
tion in our tax laws in favor of more “radical” strategies for effecting change. 
For example, I have argued elsewhere164 that same-sex couples who have reg-
istered as domestic partners in California or who have married in Massachu-
setts should adopt guerrilla warfare tactics when challenging the application 
of the tax laws to them (that is, the alleged inapplicability of Poe v. Seaborn 
to California domestic partners165 and the constitutionality of the application 
of DOMA to Massachusetts same-sex marriages166). Rather than pursuing a 
traditional test case strategy, all of the thousands of registered domestic part-
ners and same-sex married couples could file simultaneous challenges that 
would likely cause a significant—albeit temporary—disruption of the Ser-
vice’s activities. Having captured public attention for their cause, “lesbians 
and gay men could then begin to educate the masses concerning their tax 
grievances.”167
 It is worth noting the interesting convergences that result from this reshap-
ing of the duty to the tax system. Most notably, there is a convergence here of 
individual and public interest. The conventional conceptualization of the duty 
to the tax system is built on the opposition between the individual taxpayer’s 
interest in paying as little tax as possible and the public interest in a smoothly 
functioning tax system that provides all of the revenue that the government 
needs and expects to raise. To the contrary, our alternative conceptualization 
of the duty to the tax system is built on the correlation between the treatment 
of individual lesbian and gay taxpayers and the soundness of the tax system. 
Put differently, what helps the individual lesbian or gay taxpayer likewise 
helps to restore the integrity of our shared tax system. There is also a related 
convergence here of the duty of zealous advocacy and the duty to the tax 
system. In the conventional conceptualization of the duty to the tax system, 
there is a natural tension between the lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy on 
behalf of her client and her duty to the tax system, with the two duties pulling 
the lawyer in different directions. But, being based on a correlation between 
162See supra Part II.B.2.
163See, e.g., Tax Equity for Health Plan Beneficiaries Act of 2007, H.R. 1820, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Tax Equity for Domestic Partner and Health Plan Beneficiaries Act, S. 1556, 110th 
Cong. (2007).
164Infanti, Homo Sacer, supra note 87, at 49–56.
165See supra Part III.B.2.b.
166See supra Part III.B.1.
167Infanti, Homo Sacer, supra note 87, at 56.
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individual and public interest, our alternative conceptualization of the duty 
to the tax system erases this tension between the duty of zealous advocacy and 
the duty to the tax system and tends to fuse the two into a single harmonious 
whole.
 Before I conclude, I note that this reshaping of the duty to the tax system 
is consistent with a general observation that I made about the justification for 
imposing this duty on tax lawyers. As I mentioned in Part II.A above, com-
mentators argue that the duty to the tax system levels the playing field between 
two unequally matched adversaries. Upon careful analysis, I observed that it 
might be more accurate to say that, when the tax lawyer enters gray areas of 
tax characterization, she is asked to privilege her duty to the tax system over 
her duty of zealous advocacy in an attempt to right the relationship between 
the taxpayer and the Service. From this perspective, the conventional concep-
tualization of the duty to the tax system requires the tax lawyer, who happens 
to be representing the relatively more powerful party (that is, the taxpayer), 
to take account of the interests of the less powerful party (that is, the federal 
government) whenever she exercises discretion in settling on the appropriate 
tax characterization of a transaction. For lesbian and gay taxpayers, however, 
this power differential is reversed: the more powerful party is the federal gov-
ernment, and the less powerful party is the taxpayer. My reconstruction of the 
duty to the tax system, which, on its face, may seem somewhat radical, really 
does no more than take account of this reversal of the power differential. It 
simply re-works the duty to the tax system to right the relationship between 
lesbian and gay taxpayers and the Service.
 In this regard, my analysis here is in keeping with an “insight shared among 
many contemporary legal ethics scholars”; namely, “that ethics analysis must 
be context-specific in some respects.”168 More particularly, my analysis has 
much in common with recent work by Susan Carle in which she argues 
that where there are “obvious and substantial power imbalances among the 
interests affected by the representation,” then the attorney should take the 
imbalance of power into account when making ethical judgments.169 Carle 
maintains that an attorney’s zealousness in representing her client should vary 
inversely with the client’s power; in other words, where the parties are not 
evenly matched, a lawyer should decrease her zealous advocacy as her client’s 
relative power increases and, conversely, a lawyer should increase her zealous 
advocacy as her client’s relative power decreases.170 This contextual approach 
168Carle, supra note 40, at 117; see, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 19 (arguing that the methods 
for most effectively regulating lawyers depend on the context of the representation); David B. 
Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers?—Managing Conflict and 
Context in Professional Regulation, 65 F L. R. 465, 482–91 (1996) (discussing this 
topic further in the course of responding to critiques of Wilkins, supra note 19); see also Carle, 
supra note 40, at 117 n.8 (containing a list of articles espousing this view).
169Carle, supra note 40, at 118.
170Id. at 119.
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focusing on the relative power of the interests at stake in a representation 
nicely explains how a tax attorney can, at the same time, temper the zealous-
ness of her advocacy in the representation of heterosexual taxpayers (because 
the balance of power generally favors them) but refuse to temper that same 
zealousness in her representation of lesbian and gay clients (because the bal-
ance of power is decidedly tipped against them).
V.  Concluding Remarks
I began this Article with a discussion of the tension created by a tax lawyer’s 
divided loyalties—that constant pull between her client-regarding duty of 
zealous advocacy and her public-regarding duty to the tax system. I ended 
the Article with the proffer of a harmonious view of these loyalties—an align-
ment of the duty of zealous advocacy with the duty to the tax system that is 
designed to preserve the interests and restore the integrity of both the indi-
vidual lesbian and gay taxpayer and the tax system itself. In between, I hope 
to have raised your awareness of how lesbians and gay men can (and do) 
experience the tax system in fundamentally different—and far more oppres-
sive—ways than heterosexuals do. More importantly, however, for those who 
represent lesbian and gay taxpayers, I hope to have opened an ethical space in 
which they can feel comfortable that protecting the interests of their lesbian 
and gay clients will likewise safeguard the integrity of the tax system by pre-
venting it from being misused to further odious ends.
